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A shift from functionalism to constitutionalism is not a matter of changing the guards from
one day to the other. These are incremental processes, over time. It is primarily a matter of
attitudes and perceptions of existing instruments and their proper role and function. First of all,
it influences the application and interpretation of existing instruments. It may lead, as experienced in the EEC, to recognition of implied exceptions. Second, it eventually influences the
shape of agreements and instruments. It is submitted that the evolution has already begun in
case law and could be traced in a number of adopted or unadopted panel reports still under the
GATT of 1947, and in more recent panel reports and Appellate Body reports under the WTO
since 1995. In the light of such historical experience, it is likely that positive standards will
emerge in many other fields, including labour and the environment, exerting limiting effects
on the free flow of goods and services.
Constitutionalism, finally, also addresses the legitimacy of policy goals and how they are
being defined. Rule-making and standard setting needs to be able to bring about a high level
of acceptance. It requires substantial involvement of producer, consumer and public good
interests, all at the same time. It needs to strike a proper balance between the different branches
of government in this process. As rules and standard-setting on the international level expand,
we seriously need to think about how international organizations can be brought closer to
elected representation.
In conclusion, these are all issues which go much beyond the WTO. The question of
environmental or labor standards and the limits to trade, addressed by this panel, are the
symptoms of a wider issue of governance. The problems addressed affect a great number of
institutions, domestically, and on the international level. These are constitutional questions of
governance of the global system at large. The WTO, and perhaps the Bretton Woods
institutions, due to their political and economic effectiveness, are at the forefront of attention.
The framework to address these issues, however, has to be a broader one. It fits to the title and
theme of this conference: International Law in Fennent. In short, it is a matter of interfacing
trade, environment, and human rights, of bringing about mutual support, and in case of conflict
balance the interests based upon a coherent constitutional and intellectual framework.
Ultimately, we are faced with the question whether international law as we knew it, from
coexistence to cooperation, is up to the task of global integration, or whether constitutionalism
will eventually lead to what we may call global law.
REMARKS BY JOHN H. JACKSON

The limits of international trade must be understood within the context of the institutional
framework of the WTO, in particular, the decision-making and dispute settlement processes.
The WTO dispute settlement rules are contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), which is Annex 2 to the WTO agreement. The DSU includes some comments on the
philosophy, the direction and the purposes of the dispute settlement procedures. Article 3.2 of
the DSU has some very interesting phrases. One of those phrases (roughly paraphrased) says,
''None of the reports of the dispute settlement procedure should result in a change, addition,
or subtraction from the rights and obligations of the members." Some have pointed to that
clause as a warning against judicial activism. The panelists and Appellate Body members
should not be changing the direction of the system in terms of its basic goals. Any changes to
the direction of the system are to be left in the hands of the sovereign states, the nation states,
and the members. I interpret Article 3.2 to mean: "Be careful."
These first five years of the WTO may have been the most interesting five years of
international jurisprudence in the history of mankind. This jurisprudence has been quite
remarkable because it has had to struggle intimately with the details of the tension between
nation-state sovereignty ideas and the need for multilateral solutions in a cooperative mechanism, particularly in the economic area, but arguably in all areas. In the economic area, it is
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something that addresses the sowcalled "prisoner's dilemma." In other words, if governments
"go it alone" they actually create problems for everyone, including themselves. The WTO is
part of tht' nt'w attention by economists, including several Nobel Prize winners. to the institutions that underpin the market and the reality that the markets will not work without
appropriate human institutions. l
The WTO reflects an imbalance of human institutions. with its remarkably sophisticated
dl!<>pute !<>ettlement process (i.e., the judicial branch) and its remarkably constrained decisionmaking process (which you could call the legislative branch). The constraints on the decisionmaking branch came about in the last three to four months of 1993. in the negotiations of the
Uruguay Round. when the negotiators went to work more seriously on what we can roughly call
the "WTO Charter:'1 That charter was much broader. more embracing. and more threatening
to national sovereignty than the negotiators wanted. Therefore, the negotiators began to change
that charter by rolling back the decision-making processes. Specifically, they began to constrain
tho~e processes with super-majority requirements and stricter requirements of consensus deci..ion making. Consensus is not unanimity. but something approaching it, in that it can lead to
any country having the right to block measures, thereby resulting in stalemate. Indeed, that is
part of what we saw in the Seattle fiasco, in the selection of the director-general, and in
numerou" decisions made during the course of the first years of the WTO.
Turning more specifically to environment and labor questions. we can see a rich history
ofjuri$prudence relating to the environment. This jurisprudence has been the most interesting.
fundamental. and thoughtful about the relationship of environment to other nonos, particularly
trade treaty norms, that we have ever seen. One reason for this jurisprudence is the existence
of the Appellate Body system. We have been tremendously lucky to have seven people with
a diven,it)' of backgrounds and knowledge appointed to the Appellate Body roster. They have
interacted well \\1th one another. and a system ofcollegiality has developed, which is extremely
important in the Appellate Body system and hopefully can be continued with the new members.
We have had three important cases, namely. the Gasoline case against the United States
by Venezuela and Brazil/ the BeefHormones case,4 and the Shrimp!Turtle case.s The Shrimp/
Turtlt: I,.'u.;;e raises some very fundamental issues, and the decision took the so-called
"evolutionary approach" to interpreting treaty language. Yet, throughout the early jurisprudence of the WTO and the Appellate Body opinions, there have been constant statements of
deference to nation-state sovereignty. Such deference statements are in cases such as the
G(/$uline case and the Japanese Alcoholic Beverages case,6 where the Appellate Body in fact
held against the nation~state. Nevertheless. the Appellate Body held that the nation~state should
have u very \\1de scope to regulate, but there are boundaries. These Appellate Body reports tell
U~ what these boundaries are, which mayor may not be the line that you would logically draw.
But in the BeefHOnllOlleS case, the Appellate Body rolled back the first-level panel. saying that
the panel had over$tepped a bit. The Appellate Body was prepared to step back and give a
wider scope to the nation-state.
In the Shrimp!Tllrtle case. though, there was an additional interesting layer added to some
of these l'>~ues. Part of the jurisprudence carried forward from the GATT. going back to a case
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, WTO Appell.lte Body Report, BC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WrlDS26 &
..m/ABIR• .n.lopted Feb. B. 1998.
, WTO Appellate Body Report. United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
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called the Belgian Family Allowances/ has been to look at the word "product" in Article III
of GATT (the national treatment of like products). This suggests that the dispute settlement
system and the treaty structure are focused on the characteristics of the products and not on the
characteristics of how they were made, the home country that produced them, or the production
process itself. The product-process distinction has been a fairly bright-line bulwark against
sliding down a slippery slope of blocking products at the border for activities related to
production, such as Sunday closing laws, hours for labor, or environmental measures. This
distinction has been heavily criticized by some of the proponents of both labor and environment. In fact, the product-process distinction will probably not survive and perhaps should not
survive. The key challenge is to know how far down the slope we are willing to slide, in other
words, to find the handholds on the slope. The question then becomes: is an Appellate Body
function or a negotiating function needed to address this problem?
In the ShrimpfI'urtle case, the Appellate Body ignored that question, while at the same time
suggesting that it could uphold border measures that were really targeted at process (i.e., a ban
on shrimp caught with nets that kill sea turtles). This issue remains open, and it will be very
interesting to see where it leads. Thus far, efforts to have a decision-making process or a
negotiating process solve some of the environmental clashes with trade have failed, partly due
to the institutional infirmities alluded to at the beginning of these remarks. Therefore, there is
a very strong impetus to push those issues in the direction of a resolution, and the dispute
settlement process is a logical target.

7 Belgium-Family Allowances (Allocations FamiIiaIes), Nov. 6,

1952, GAITB.I.S.D. (lstSupp.) at 59 (1953).
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